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McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics
INTRODUCTION
n January of this year, George Will warned that "[t]he criminalization of
normal political interactions is especially ominous when aesthetic
considerations expose a person to prosecution for actions inseparable from
the quotidian business of representative government."' Will's admonition
was generated by the political corruption conviction of former Virginia
Governor Robert McDonnell .
In June, a unanimous Supreme Court expressed similar sentiments
when it vacated that conviction. McDonnell had been convicted of
bribery offenses for doing political favors for a generous benefactor who
had showered him and his family with money and gifts worth over
$170,000. 4 According to the Court, the favors McDonnell did were not
"official acts" that could be prosecuted under the relevant statutes.5 The
Court noted that "[c]onscientious public officials arrange meetings for
constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in
events all the time. The basic compact underlying representative
government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents
and act appropriately on their concerns .... This language appears to
represent an endorsement of an important theme in current American
political discourse: the criminalization of politics critique. The theme can
be found in the academic literature,7 polemical writing, 8 legal briefs,9 and
at least one judicial opinion. 10
1 George Will, Virginia's Former Governor Faces Prison Over Politics, WASH.
POST (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginias-former-
govemor-faces-prison-over-politics/2016/01/06/2af3ff74-b3e6-1 le5-9388-
46602 1d971 destory .html?utm term = .8d9 lfa343d74.
2 See id.
3 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
4 Id. at 2361.
5 Id. at 2375.
6 Id. at 2372.
7 E.g., Jonathan Rauch, Political Realism: How Hacks, Machines, Big Money, and
Back-Room Deals Can Strengthen American Democracy, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
2017]
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The essence of the critique goes something like this. The major
role in prosecuting state and local corruption has been assumed by the
federal government, and is discharged by United States Attorneys. I I They
have at their disposal a broad array of broadly worded statutes. I2 This
combination raises such dangers as traps for the unwary, I3 partisan
prosecutions brought by politically motivated prosecutors,1 4 and threats to
federalist values.1 5 These themes are not new. What is new about the
criminalization critique is that it adds to them the claim that the tools in
the federal criminal arsenal are being used against everyday political
May 2015. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad
Definitions of Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 462 (2015).
" E.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Value of Political Corruption, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/thomas-edsall-the-value-of-
political-corruption.html; cf, Dave Neese, Opinion, Prosecution Takes a Bridge Too Far,
TRENTONIAN (May 10, 2015),
http://www.trentoian.com/article/TT/201505 10/NEWS/150519995.
9 E.g., Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter
Brief for Center for Law and Justice]; Brief for Former Virginia Attorneys General as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355
(2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief for Former Attorneys General]; Brief for Virginia
Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief for Law Professors].
10 United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015).
11 See, e.g., Cheol Liu & John L. Mikesell, The Impact ofPublic Officials'
Corruption on the Size andAllocation of U.S. State Spending, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346
(2014); U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS
OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2014 22-28 (2014) (providing statistics of
federal, state, local, and private corruption prosecutions for 2014).
12 See generally NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 167-71, 280-90 (6th ed. 2015).
13 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 411 (1999).
14 See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 12, at 342-44.
15 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:
Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 155-56 (1994); Will, supra note
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practices essential to representative government. 16 Rather than improve
government, these prosecutions undermine it.
McDonnell is the quintessential example. It is true that he and his
family accepted lavish gifts from a pharmaceutical industrialist who
wished to do business with the state. 17 However, he was prosecuted,
according to the critics, for doing routine favors for the donor, such as
making introductions to state officials and arranging meetings with
staffers. These are the sorts of things that politicians do for constituents all
the time. Thus, to prosecute McDonnell and those like him is to
criminalize politics itself. The Court's opinion may be read as an
acceptance of the critique.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the critique and
McDonnell's impact on it. As for McDonnell itself, I contend that the
decision gives proponents of the critique less than they claim. 18 The
opinion seems to say that an official whose case is identical to
McDonnell's could, under a proper approach to bribery, be prosecuted for
the same crimes, with the same facts used as evidence. Indeed, the Court
raised the possibility that McDonnell himself could be successfully
prosecuted in a retrial. 19 The article begins with a discussion of the
critique in order to put McDonnell in context. In particular, I examine
what is new in the debate over how the federal government should handle
possible corruption, and the extent to which McDonnell is part of that
shift. Part I explores the critique in depth. Part II analyzes the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonnell and its background. As a unanimous
16 E.g., Brief for Law Professors, supra note 9, at 13; Brief for Center for Law and
Justice, supra note 9, at 11. See generally George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to
Ordinary Corruption: With a Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, And The Criminalization
of Politics, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 177 (2015) [hereinafter Applying Citizens United].
17 See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487-94 (4th Cir. 2015), rev'd, 136
S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (detailing gifts and favors).
"8 But see Jacob Eisler, McDonnell andAnti-Corruption's Last Stand, 50 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 51) (available on SSRN) (noting McDonnell's
discussion of representation and significance as a "signal of how the Court might be
expected to intervene in politics more generally.").
19 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.
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decision, McDonnell may be of great significance in how the legal system
treats the federal government's role. Part III offers some speculation on
the federal anticorruption enterprise going forward.
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS CRITIQUE: OLD WINE IN
NEW BOTTLES?
A. FEDERALISM
It may seem somewhat surprising that the federal government-
through the local United States Attorney-is at the forefront of the battle
against corruption in the states. This role appears to be premised on a view
of the states as unable to do the job themselves. There certainly are
structural problems in expecting one group of state officials to prosecute
another group of state (or local) officials. 2 0 Even so, what part of the
federal Constitution authorizes the national government to do it?
Professor Adam Kurland has contended that the Guarantee Clause
may be such a source of authority.2 1 The idea has merit, but does not seem
to have motivated Congress. The principal federal statutes used against
22 23corruption are based upon the Postal Power,22 the Commerce Power, andthe Spending Power. 4 The Mail Fraud Statute25 is the source of the
20 See generally George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? Mail
Fraud, State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 225, 239-44 (1997)
[hereinafter Federalism].
21 Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecution of
State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 486 (1989). The Guarantee Clause
states that " [t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 7.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
25 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
[Vol. 5:1
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26Honest Services concept. One cannot use the mail to deprive citizens of
the right to honest services. The Hobbs Act-forbidding unlawful receipt
of money under color of official right27 -is based on interference with
commerce. 28 The Federal Program Bribery Act 29 is triggered if a
jurisdiction receives the requisite number of funds.3
Federalism criticisms abound. 31 The most basic is that the national
government is doing the states' job to the point of treating them as
32subordinate units. Such tutelage prevents them from developing their
own capacity. 33 One might even see a form of commandeering: 34 the
35national government is telling the states how to govern.
Federalism objections are part of the criminalization critique.
George Will declares that "federalism has become a casualty" in
McDonnell,36 and cites a brief filed on McDonnell's behalf that warns
against "federaliz[ing] the law of public corruption ... ,. All states have
criminal laws against corruption; many have comprehensive ethics codes
26 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
21Id. § 1951(a).
29 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
30 Id. § 666(b).
31 E.g., Moohr, supra note 15. But see Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal
Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92 Ky. L.J. 75, 83-86 (2003) (defending the
federal role).
32 See Federalism, supra note 20, at 241 (discussing state sovereignty).
33 E.g., Moohr, supra note 15, at 175-76.
34 The anti-commandeering doctrine was developed in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
35 See Federalism, supra note 20, at 271-72 (discussing commandeering).
36 George Will, Opinion, McDonnell's Case Might Help Others Accused of
Corruption, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/how-bob-mcdonnell-might-help-others-suspected-of-public-corruption-go-
free/2016/01/29/d3e6eb9e-bf96-1 le5-bcda-62a36b394160_story.html.
37 Id. (citing amicus brief of Former State Attorney's General).
2017]
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and enforcement mechanisms. 8 One group of Virginia law professors
supporting McDonnell went so far as to suggest that such a state system
could trump federal law. 9 In sum, the federalism argument plays a role in
the critique, but it has been around for some time, even at the level of the
40Supreme Court.
B. VAGUENESS AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Vagueness and prosecutorial discretion are often treated together,41
and I will do so here in elaborating this portion of the criminalization
critique. A classic example of vagueness issues is the Mail Fraud Statute.42
The statute forbids, in part, use of the mails in "any scheme or artifice to
defraud .... ,4' Beginning in the 1940's, lower courts read this language
to include depriving citizens of the intangible right to honest services.44
The doctrine has had its ups and downs. After the Supreme Court
disapproved of this reading,45 Congress endorsed it by providing that "the
term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. 46 However, the
Court's 2010 decision in Skilling v. United States limited honest services
fraud to bribes and kickbacks. 4
3" E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268A (2016) (setting standards for public officials).
39 Brief for Law Professors, supra note 9, at 3-4.
40 E.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (declining to "construe
the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the
Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and
state officials .... ").
41 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 320-22.
45 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
46 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
47 Skillingv. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
[Vol. 5:1
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To appreciate the vagueness problem in the mail fraud context, one
should note the tortuous path an official must tread. The mail fraud
statute 48 sends us to 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which sets forth the honest services
doctrine. Skilling tells the official that this only means bribery and
kickbacks, neither of which terms is included, or defined, in either
statute.49 Skilling did say that these offenses "draw[] content" from
existing federal statutes such as those covering bribery by federal
officials. 50 Further complicating the matter is the fact that a federal court
trying the official is likely to utilize the concept of quid pro quo, which
appears in none of the statutes referenced above.51
The vagueness critique recently received substantial academic
support in Professor Albert Alschuler's article "Criminal Corruption: Why
Broad Definitions of Bribery Make Things Worse., 52 Professor Alschuler
is particularly critical of the "intent to influence" approach to bribery.53
Read broadly, "'intent to influence' statutes appear to make a criminal of
every lobbyist who buys lunch for a legislator and of every campaign
contributor who hopes that his contribution will make its recipient more
sympathetic to his interests. 54
Attacks on the vagueness of federal law are closely related to
attacks on prosecutorial discretion. In his famous Sorich dissent from
denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia warned of "abuse by headline-grabbing
prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate
CEOs who engage in any manner of unappealing or ethically questionable
" 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
'9 Skilling, 561 U.S. 358 at 408 (2010).
5 1 Id. at 366.
51 See generally, Brian H. Connor, The Quid Pro Quo Quark Unstable Elementary
Particle of Honest Services Fraud, 65 CATH. U. L. REv. 335 (2016).
52 Alschuler, supra note 7, at 469.
53 See id. at 466-72.
54 Id. at 466. Professor Alschuler prefers an "illegal contract" approach to bribery. Id.
at 472-74.
2017]
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conduct., 55 Professor Alschuler cautions that "[b]road definitions of
bribery not only sweep into their net common and widely accepted
behavior. They also invite unjustified inferences and empower prosecutors
to pick their targets. 56
It's tempting to single out United States Attorneys as the principal
actors in the criminalization of politics. They are relatively unaccountable,
yet they are major political players within their states or judicial districts.
History is replete with examples of United States Attorneys of one party
building a reputation as a corruption fighter by prosecuting state and local
politicians-frequently of the other party-and riding that reputation to
higher office.57 Apart from his or her political ambitions, a United States
Attorney is often accused of partisanship when selecting defendants. 58
On a loftier level, the United States Attorney may see himself
charged with the mission of not just "cleaning up" the state, but of
changing its political culture.59 In the McDonnell oral argument, Justice
Breyer cast this phenomenon as a separation of powers issue, stating: "The
Department of Justice in the Executive Branch becomes the ultimate
arbiter of how public officials are behaving in the United States, State,
local, and national. 60 Whether viewed as primarily an issue of federalism,
or as an issue of separation of powers, the active role of United States
55 Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
56 Alschuler, supra note 7, at 492.
57 See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 342.
581 Id. at 342-44.
59 See William K. Rashbaum & Susanne Craig, In Two Corruption Cases, the
Culture ofAlbany Will Go on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at Al.
60 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355
(2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Transcript]. Building on his momentum, Justice Breyer
invoked prosecutions for "common" political behavior, and stated that "suddenly, to give
that kind of power to a criminal prosecutor, who is virtually uncontrollable, is dangerous
in the separation of powers .... Breyer may be right in his discovery of the implications
of a unilateral federal role in prosecuting corruption, but it is hardly a new development.
Some might see this as more of a federalism problem than a separation of powers one.
[Vol. 5:1
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Attorneys in this field is well established, as are criticisms of it and the
broad statutes that permit it.
C. THE CRITIQUE: ADDING NEW ELEMENTS TO OLD
The criminalization critique is thus not a new phenomenon in
American political-legal discourse. It builds upon an extensive body of
academic writing and judicial decisions.62 Developments outside the area
of politically related crime are relevant as well. In recent years the Court
has been particularly active in showing concern for vagueness in general.63
Even though not directed solely at politically related crimes, this concern
bolsters the critique. However, the critique does sound a new note that
goes beyond considerations of federalism, vagueness, and prosecutorial
discretion. A central tenet is that current prosecutions of public officials
target practices that are inevitably part of representative democracy, and
are frequently beneficial.
As Thomas Edsall wrote in his provocative article The Value of
Political Corruption: "[e]ffective governance is currently running head-on
into growing public skepticism about the legitimacy of political
maneuvering and compromise. 64 A good example of the kind of practice
61 E.g., Gregory H. Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree: The Use
andAbuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 148 (1990).
62 E.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 365 (2010); United States v. Sun-
Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
290-91 (1992); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991); McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987).
63Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015); Yates v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 405, 421 (discussing an example of the
vagueness concern in the political corruption context); United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d.
128, 138-139 (3d Cir. 2009).
64 Edsall, supra note 8. For an example of public skepticism, see Christopher
Robertson, et al., The Appearance and Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An
Empirical Investigation, 8 J. L. ANALYSIS 375, 413 (discussing example of simulated
prosecution for political bargaining in which mock jurors inferred "quidpro quo
2017]
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that yields "effective governance" is logrolling. The Seventh Circuit's
partial reversal of the corruption conviction of former Illinois Governor
Rod Blagojevich represents an important judicial endorsement of the
65practice. Part of Blagojevich's conviction for multiple offenses was
based on the Governor's attempt to make a deal with President-Elect
Obama: the Governor would use his power to fill the vacated Senate seat
by appointing a close associate of the President-Elect. In return, the
President would name him to a cabinet post. 66 The Seventh Circuit ruled
that such horse trading is part and parcel of American politics,
"fundamentally unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment.,
67
The court stated that "[g]overnance would hardly be possible without
these accommodations,, 68 and declined to find in the relevant federal
statutes "a rule making everyday politics criminal. 69
The court cited no precedent for this victory for the criminalization
critique, 70 but there is an extensive literature extolling the virtues of
transactional politics. 71 According to one exponent of this view: "[b]ack-
scratching and logrolling are signs of a healthy political system, not a
corrupt one.",72 Such views might be limited to dealings between elected
agreements from the fact-patterns of seemingly -reciprocal behavior that are ubiquitous in
contemporary politics.").
65 United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2015).
66 See id. at 733 (discussing details of the proposed bargain).
67 Id. at 734.
6
1Id. at 735.
69 Id.
70 The Court relied on hypotheticals drawn from daily politics and on an anecdote
concerning President Eisenhower and Chief Justice Warren. Id. at 737.
71 See, e.g., Applying Citizens United, supra note 16, at 229.
72 Rauch, supra note 7, at 7. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery
and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 788 (1985). The issue of
patronage may be closely related. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S.
62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The choice between patronage and the merit
principle-or, to be more realistic about it, the choice between the desirable mix of merit
and patronage principles in widely varying federal, state, and local political contexts-is
[Vol. 5:1
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officials, 73 but I see them as closely related to a broader view of American
politics and government as highly reciprocal and marked by interactions of
all types. In a seminal article, David Mills and Robert Weisberg noted that
"any definition [of corruption] will partake of uncertain notions of how we
identify when an 'outside' influence so distorts the governmental
structures, processes, or economic systems as to merit the term
'corrupt.'74
Deciding when interactions are corrupt or part of daily political life
is particularly hard in the case of elected officials. For constituents,
especially supporters, the relationship with "their" elected officials does
not end with the campaign. If anything, it begins there. Viewed in this
light, the Supreme Court's emphasis on access and influence in Citizens
United v. Federal Elections Commission75 makes some sense.76 As
developed below,77 the outpouring of support for McDonnell from public
officials stems largely from the perception that the favors he did for the
person who had given him extensive gifts were typical of what elected
officials do and are expected to do for constituents. 78 The outcome in
McDonnell thus may represent an important victory for the criminalization
of politics critique.
not so clear that I would be prepared, as an original matter, to chisel a single, inflexible
prescription into the Constitution.").
73 Applying Citizens United, supra note 16, at 231.
74 David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White
Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1377 (2008).
75 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
76 See also Eisler, supra note 18, at 3 ("The Court has thus revealed it expects little
in terms of disinterested commitment to the public good from democratic
representatives.").
77 See infra text accompanying notes 126-30.
7" Brief of Former Federal Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-11,
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) [hereinafter Brief of
Former Federal Officials].
2017]
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D. A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE
The criminalization of politics argument runs into the conventional
wisdom that corruption is bad, and that we expect public officials to know
their fiduciary obligations and honor them.79 Thus, a federal common law
of political corruption that fleshes out these duties by building on statutes
should not be viewed as a surprise, and is an institutionally sound way of
ensuring that they are enforced. 80 The critique's response is that the
resultant system-apart from concerns like federalism and fairness to
defendants-sweeps into the net practices that, while perhaps unseemly,
are necessary and even beneficial.
The criminalization of politics argument has considerable force. In
this subsection, I offer three brief critiques of the critique. The first is that
it has a strong element of circularity. Unless one is prepared to deny the
possibility of any political crime-for example the proverbial bagful of
money delivered to a key legislator before a votel-it is hard to identify
which corruption prosecutions involve the criminalization of politics, and
which do not. Assuming the conduct arguably fits within one or more
statutes, it becomes necessary to make value judgments in all but the most
blatant cases. The result is likely to be a proliferation of accusations of
criminalization every time a politician is indicted-a sort of "everybody
does it" defense.
82
There are signs that this is already happening. The corruption trials
of both former New York Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver and former
New York Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos provoked cries of
79 Mills & Weisberg, supra note 74, at 1399.
"0 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: The Federal
Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1815, 1826-29 (2011).
"' E.g. Abby Goodnough, Massachusetts Inquiries Breeding Public Distrust, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/1 l/us/1 lboston.html?_r=0.
12 Dahlia Lithwick, The "'Everybody Does It" Defense, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/supremecourt dispatches/2016/04/the_
supreme court might let bob mcdonnell off the hook.html; see Mills & Weisberg,
supra note 74, at 1396.
[Vol. 5:1
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criminalization of politics. 83 So did an investigation of the Mayor of New
York's fundraising practices. 84 Particularly telling was the assertion by
Mr. Silver's lawyer that "it's virtually impossible for someone to serve in
this citizen-legislator model and not have some form of conflict., 85 The
conclusion that this argument leads to is that if some interactions are
endemic to the system, and "everybody does it," then "it" must not be
corruption. The very fact that conduct is widespread insulates that conduct
from prosecution.
A second response to the critique is that it is hard to know what
role it should play in the legal system. Perhaps it is a guideline for
prosecutorial discretion. But an attack on prosecutorial discretion is at the
heart of the critique to begin with. Perhaps "good" prosecutorial discretion
is fine-good being defined as not criminalizing politics. This takes us
squarely back to the question of what political conduct is sufficiently
criminal to merit prosecution-a question we would still apparently leave
to prosecutors. As long as the conduct in question arguably fits within the
bounds of some statute, statutory construction becomes key. The critique
thus emerges as a possible canon of construction. This is the most
plausible explanation of the logrolling holding in Blagojevich.86 Courts
13 William K. Rashbaum, Tapes Played at Skelos Corruption Trial Portray Strategy
Used Against Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/nyregion/tapes-played-at-skelos-corruption-trial-
portray -strategy -used-against-democrats.html; Benjamin Weiser & Susanne Craig,
Lawyers Offer Contrasting Views of Sheldon Silver as His Corruption Trial Starts, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/nyregion/lawyers-offer-
contrasting-view s -ofsheldon-silver-as-his-corruption-trial -starts.html.
14 See Editorial, Crime or Not, Fund-Raising in New York Stinks, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/opinion/crime-or-not-fund-raising-in-
new-york-stinks.html?_r=0 (quoting former Congressman Anthony Weiner as
denouncing the attacks as "criminalizing" basic retail politics).
15 Benjamin Weiser & Susanne Craig, Silver's Corruption Trial Closes With
Competing Views of His Actions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/nyregion/jury-hears-closing-arguments-in-sheldon-
silver-corruption-trial.html.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 67-72. The canon of construction analysis is
bolstered by the fact that the court specifically stated that the contrary result could not
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would apply statutes aimed at political corruption by utilizing a principle
of not criminalizing politics. They would be guided largely by their
freestanding notion of what constitutes politics that ought to be treated as
criminal. The exercise in statutory construction would not be dominated
by the statute itself. The reappearance of vagueness is obvious.
A third criticism is that the criminalization critique extends the
Citizens United8 7 approach beyond the electoral and post-electoral
contexts to "ordinary corruption." 88 The majority opinion in that case is a
wholehearted endorsement of a freewheeling approach to reciprocity and
interaction in politics. According to Justice Kennedy:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in
representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected
representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary
corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support
those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for,
or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is
that the candidate will respond by producing those political
outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on
responsiveness. 89
I find this approach unduly permissive in the case of appointed officials. It
can lead to treating gifts to them as somehow equivalent to campaign
contributions to elected officials. Interactions present difficult problems
when the officials-such as mayors-perform both executive and
legislative functions. There is a real tension between the Citizens United
have been what Congress intended. See United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 735
(7th Cir. 2015).
17 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
See generally Applying Citizens United, supra note 16, at 194-95 (discussing, and
rejecting, such an extension).
" Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)).
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approach and what the Supreme Court has called the "great end of
government-the impartial execution of the laws." 90 In both the electoral
and non-electoral contexts, direct transfers of things of value are
particularly suspect. 91 Consider a bribe-private enrichment from public
office derived from outside sources-given to produce unequal
administration in the form of partiality. Such conduct should not benefit
from whatever shield the supporter-candidate relationship provides in the
electoral context.92 Sometimes politics should be criminalized.
Despite these flaws, one can see the critique as a powerful
restatement of previous arguments against federal prosecution, as well as
new themes, derived in part from Citizens United. It was inevitable that
proponents of the critique would find a prosecution to prove their point.
The one they chose was that of former Governor of Virginia Robert
McDonnell .
II. MCDONNELL: A WIN FOR THE CRITIQUE OR PROSECUTION AS
USUAL?
A. THE SAGA
McDonnell and his wife had accepted what the Supreme Court
called "$175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits" 94 from a Virginia
pharmaceutical businessman who sought assistance from the state,
primarily public university testing of a new product, and its inclusion in
90 Civil Serv. Comm'nv. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).
91 See, e.g., Applying Citizens United, supra note 16, at 184.
92 It is, of course, possible for a contribution to be a bribe. See McCormick v. United
States, 500 U.S. 257, 276 (1991). The principal difference between the application of the
law of bribery to the contexts appears to be the need for an explicit quid pro quo in the
electoral context. See Applying Citizens United, supra note 16, at 218.
93 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
94 Id. at 2357.
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the state employees' health plan. 95 This dry description hardly does justice
to the soap opera quality of the relationship. It included a nearly $20,000
shopping spree for Mrs. McDonnell at Oscar de la Renta, Luis Vuitton,
and Bergdorf Goodman. For his part, the Governor got free golf, golf
equipment, and a Rolex, in addition to substantial financial benefits.96 The
donor never received the state action he was seeking. However, the
governor did arrange meetings and introductions for him with state
officials. He also touted the product, and hosted a luncheon at the
Governor's mansion to do so.
B. THE TRIAL AND THE "OFFICIAL ACTS" ISSUE
One prominent observer has said of the case: "There's no such
thing as a free Rolex." 97 The McDonnells were indicted and convicted,
primarily of wire fraud honest services violations98 and Hobbs Act
violations. 99 The Supreme Court's analysis referred to these charges as
"bribery. 1 I° This shorthand is possible because the Court has treated the
Hobbs Act as equivalent to bribery when dealing with public officials,101
and has interpreted the honest services component of wire (and mail) fraud
95 Id. at 2364.
96 United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 488-90 (4th Cir. 2015).
97 Zephyr Teachout, Opinion, There's No Such Thing as a Free Rolex, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/opiion/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-
free-rolex.html.
98 See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 493 (describing proceedings below).
99 Id. at 505.
100McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.
101 See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992) (stating with respect to
common law extortion: "[e]xtortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of
what we would now describe as 'taking a bribe."'); id. at 290 ("Over the past 20 years,
the Hobbs Act has served as the engine for a stunning expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by state and local laws-acts of public
corruption by state and local officials.") (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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as covering bribery and kickbacks.1 0 2 The use of the term bribery triggers
the operation of 18 U.S.C. § 201, which Skilling said would help guide
honest services bribery prosecutions. 103 Under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A), it
is a crime if a public official "corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts,
or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally ... in return for
being influenced in the performance of any official act .. ,104 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(a)(3) defines official act as "any decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in
such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or
profit." 105
At the trial there was little dispute about what McDonnell had
done. The dominant question was a legal one: whether he had performed
"official acts," given the importance of that concept in § 201's structure. 106
112 Skillingv. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408 (2010).
1
1
3 Id. at 412.
104 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) (2012).
115 Id. § 201(a)(3).
106 The mere receipt of money by itself is not illegal. It must have been received in
connection with official acts. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2):
Whoever•.., being a public official or person selected to be a
public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks,
receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value
personally or for any other person or entity, in return for:
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act;
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to
collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the
commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of
the official duty of such official or person;
... shall be fined under this title or not more than three times the
monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or
imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be
2017]
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His actions on behalf of the donor consisted mainly of introductions to
state officials, and a somewhat generalized touting of his product.
McDonnell knew that the donor wanted the state universities to test his
product, but did not appear to have directly committed to making that
happen. A luncheon at the governor's mansion showed general support.107
In its instructions on honest services bribery, the district court "provided a
near-verbatim recitation" of the relevant portions of § 201, particularly the
definition of "official acts." 10 8 The same concept guided consideration of
the alleged Hobbs Act violations. The instructions were broad, stating, for
example, that "official actions may include acts that a public official
customarily performs, even if those actions are not described in any law,
rule, or job description." 10 9 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
instructions. It noted that the trial court's explanation of the meaning of
official action was "tethered" to the statutory language referring to
"decisions or actions on a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or
controversy' that may come before the government." 110
Thus the government got instructions permitting it to argue that a
wide range of official actions had occurred. This approach to McDonnell's
conduct had been part of the government's case since the indictment. A
specific reproduction of that document may be helpful. It accused the
defendant of:
[P]roviding favorable official action on behalf of JW and
Star Scientific as opportunities arose, including the official
actions set forth below in (i)-(v);
disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
United States.
107 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2363 (2016).
10" United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
109 Id. at 506.
110 Id. at 509.
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i. arranging meetings for JW with Virginia government
officials, who were subordinates of the Governor, to
discuss and promote Anatabloc®;
ii. hosting, and the defendants attending, events at the
Governor's Mansion designed to encourage Virginia
university researchers to initiate studies of anatabine
and to promote Star Scientific's products to doctors for
referral to their patients;
iii. contacting other government officials in the OGV as
part of an effort to encourage Virginia state research
universities to initiate studies of anatabine;
iv. promoting Star Scientific's products and facilitating
its relationships with Virginia government officials by
allowing JW to invite individuals important to Star
Scientific's business to exclusive events at the
Governor's Mansion; and
v. recommending that senior government officials in the
OGV meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss
ways that the company's products could lower
healthcare costs.111
The government got what it wished for in terms of the ability to introduce
at trial a broad range of McDonnell's acts as "official." The Fourth Circuit
upheld this theory of the case, despite McDonnell's contention that
"official" acts must "implicate .. .official power." 112 At the Supreme
Court level, however, the old adage about being careful what you wish for
proved prophetic. In the next two subsections, this article will offer two
alternative interpretations of the unanimous Supreme Court's decision to
vacate the conviction. The prevailing view is that the criminalization
111 Indictment, United States v. McDonnell (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 314CR00012),
2014 WL 6772486.
12 McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 508. The court went to great lengths to detail the lavish
payments McDonnell received. Id. at 488.
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critique prevailed, and that the decision is a major setback for the federal
anticorruption enterprise. I I3 My own view is that the government was
arguing an untenable view of "official acts," and that the Court, while
correctly rejecting it, laid out a virtual roadmap on how McDonnell or any
official in similar circumstances could be tried for the same crimes using
the same evidence.
C. MCDONNELL: THE CRITIQUE TRIUMPHANT
Professor Zephyr Teachout has been quoted to the effect that the
decision "enshrine[s] bribery in our politics. ' 114 The phrase strikes me as a
serious overstatement. However, two aspects of the decision support the
view that it can be read as an endorsement of the critique.
One is the extremely narrow reading of the statute in which the
Court engaged. 115 The Court first considered the terms "question, matter,
113 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Vacates Ex-Virginia Governor's Graft Conviction,
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/politics/supreme-
court-bob-mcdonnell-virginia.html; Eric Lipton & Benjamin Weiser, Decision
Complicates Corruption Cases Against Officials From New York To Illinois, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2016, at A14; Supreme Court Decision Vacating Conviction ofMcDonnell
Limits Meaning of 'OfficialAct', 84 U.S.L.W. 1936 (2016); George Will, The McDonnell
Decision and the Corrupting Crusade Against 'Corruption', WASH. POST (July 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-mcdonnell-decision-and-the-cormpting-
crusade-against-corruption/20 16/07/0 1/ca208824-3ee7- 1 1e6-a66f-
aa6c1883b6blstory.html. For an insightful academic appraisal of McDonnell, see Eisler,
supra note 18, at 3 (stating that McDonnell "broke new ground"). But see Emma Quinn-
Judge & Harvey A. Silvergate, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDonnell Fails to Drave a Clear
Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2016 Cato S. Ct. Rev. 189, 204 (stating
that close examination "suggests that the constraints imposed by the Court are illusory or
limited at best.").
114 Dante Ramos, Va. Ex-Governor Wins at Supreme Court, but Corruption is Still
Illegal, BOSTON GLOBE (June 27, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/06/27/governor-wins-supreme-court-but-
corruption-still-illegal/1UHYwoO6otnV9wkXgUOgLJ/story.html.
115 The Court seems to have been guided by Justice Scalia's admonition in United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 399 (1999) ("Because this is
] McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" in 18 U.S.C. § 201, and it found
that the last four "connote a formal exercise of governmental power...
16 The Court construed "questions" or "matters" narrowly to require the
same exercise of governmental power. It applied the maxim that a word is
"known by the company it keeps." 117 Applying the approach to
McDonnell's actions, the Court stated, "a typical meeting, call or event is
not of the same stripe as a lawsuit before a court, a determination before
an agency, or a hearing before a committee ....
There were other matters that would have qualified as official
acts. 119 Thus the question arose whether the defendant had made a
"decision" or taken "action" on them. 120 The Court opted for a narrow
reading of these terms in order to avoid the "absurd" result of having
anything an official does with respect to a "question," etc. be treated as a
decision or action. Thus, speaking with someone about a matter, or even
hosting an event related to it is not enough: "Instead, something more is
required: § 201(a)(3) specifies that the public official must make a
decision or take an action on that question or matter .... ,121 The Court
clearly had in mind the exercise of governmental power, or something
close to it, such as influence on another official who does have power.
Otherwise the definition is circular: a "decision" or "action" is some form
of decision or action of virtually any sort. 122
an area where precisely targeted prohibitions are commonplace, and where more general
prohibitions have been qualified by numerous exceptions, a statute that can linguistically
be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be the
latter."); see also Eisler, supra note 18, at 3 (stating " [s]uch a narrowing interpretative
move is consistent with the Court's modem treatment of anti-corruption law.").
116McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368.
117 Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)). The Latin
form of the maxim is noscitur a sociis. Id.
118 Id. at 2369.
119 Id. at 2361.
120 Id. at 2369.
121 Id. at 2370.
122 Here, again, the Court was guided by Sun-Diamond. Id.
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There is a second set of reasons to view McDonnell as a win for
the criminalization critique: the critique's arguments are found, directly or
indirectly, throughout the decision. Most notably, Chief Justice Roberts
observed that "[c]onscientious public officials arrange meetings for
constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in
events all the time." 123 Adopting the government's position could "cast a
pall of potential prosecution" over ordinary politics: 124 "Officials might
wonder whether they could respond to even the most commonplace
requests for assistance, and citizens with legitimate concerns might shrink
from participating in democratic discourse." 
125
This is why McDonnell became such a lightning rod case for so
many public officials. They saw what he did as "routine political activity"
that public officials engage in every day on behalf of their supporters.126
Prosecuting McDonnell for the things he did threatened the highly
traditional, reciprocal, and interactive atmosphere that prevails across
American government and politics. A veritable who's who of prominent
public officials, supported by an array of academics, filed amicus briefs on
his behalf.127 Chief Justice Roberts noted the phenomenon in the oral
argument, 12 8 and cited two of the briefs in his opinion.129 Even before the
Fourth Circuit decision, Harvey Silverglate-a prominent advocate of the
critique-had referred to the amicus briefs filed at that stage as "an
123 Id. at 2372.
124 Id.
125 Id. Chief Justice Roberts noted in his opinion that "White House counsel who
worked in every administration from that of President Reagan to President Obama warn
that the Government's 'breathtaking expansion of public-corruption law would likely
chill federal officials' interactions with the people they serve and thus damage their
ability effectively to perform their duties."' Id. at 2372-73.
126 Brief of Center for Law and Justice, supra note 9, at 20.
127 Among those filing briefs were former Federal Officials, members of the Virginia
General Assembly, and Virginia Law Professors.
12" Transcript, supra note 60, at 28-29.
129 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. In addition to the brief by several White House
counsel, Chief Justice Roberts cited an amicus brief by seventy -seven Former State
Attorneys General. Id.
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extraordinary demonstration of concern by numerous sectors of political
and civil society .... 3
Other themes of the broader, traditional criticisms of the federal
anticorruption enterprise surfaced as well. The Court found that the
government's position raised "significant federalism concerns." 
13 1
Intimations of a narrower federal role might be found in the statement that
"[a] state defines itself as a sovereign through 'the structure of its
government, and the character of those who exercise government
authority.', 13 2 Vagueness concerns were also present. 133 The Court
responded to them by saying that it had construed the term "official act" in
a way that avoided them, just as it had done earlier in narrowing the term
"honest services" itself in Skilling v. United States.134 In sum, it is
tempting to conclude that the criminalization of politics critique, with its
emphasis on official-constituent interactions, and buttressed by the closely
related concerns of vagueness and federalism, won a significant victory in
McDonnell.
D. A NARROW READING
This certainly has been the prevalent reading of the case. 135 Indeed,
many observers had predicted the outcome, and its implications, after the
130 Harvey Silverglate, Op-Ed, Politics as Usual Often Isn't a Crime, BOSTON GLOBE
(May 6, 2016), https ://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/05/06/politics-usual-often-
isn-crime/o2NyNsCOFq5ZCq6H6pG5 1K/story.html.
131 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373.
132 id.
133 See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors, supra note 9, at 20-25; Brief of Former
Attorneys General, supra note 9, at 10.
134McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404
(2010)). See Eisler, supra note 18, at 17 (stating Skilling and McDonnell "relied upon
procedural concerns and the interpretive canon to limit the reach of conduct touched by
anti-corruption law.").
135 See, e.g., supra note 113.
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oral argument. 136 Still, reactions like Professor Teachout's assertion that
the decision "has enshrined bribery in our politics', 137 seem seriously off
the mark. Indeed, it is possible to read McDonnell as a narrow decision,
138
or at least as one whose implications are yet to be determined. In closing,
the Court insisted that the decision "leaves ample room for prosecuting
corruption." 139 In this subsection, I will argue that this statement is more
than a rhetorical flourish.
The starting point of any analysis has to be the realization that the
government put itself in a box from the very beginning by framing the
indictment as set forth above. 140 Count iii cited such actions as arranging
meetings and hosting events as official actions. By referring to this
conduct as "official actions" 141 the indictment was invoking 18 U.S.C §
201(3). Thus, it was possible for the defense to push the government into
the corner of fending off the accusation that virtually anything a governor
does is official because he is an official. This difficult position was made
more so by the shadow of Sun-Diamond,142 in which a unanimous
Supreme Court viewed as "absurd" the application of the gratuities
prohibition to gifts at ceremonial occasions.14 3 Justice Scalia's opinion
stated that receipt of a sports team's replica jersey by an official could not
possibly be what Congress meant by "official act." 144 Not only was the
government in McDonnell advancing a difficult argument, but the
136 E.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Lean Toward Bob McDonnell, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/justices-weigh-corruption-case-
of-bob-mcdonnell-ex-govemor-ofvirginia.html?; Supreme Court Seems Primed to
Overturn Former Va. Governor's Corruption Conviction, 84 U.S.L.W. 3593 (2016).
137 See Ramos, supra note 114.
138 See id.
139 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.
140 See supra text at note 111 (citing indictment).
141 id.
142 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 407-08
(1999).
143 Id. at 408.
144 Id. at 406-07.
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emphasis on "official acts"-which even reached the level of coverage of
the trial instructions by the New York Times 145-diverted attention from
the government's strong point: the extraordinary largesse that the
McDonnells received. 146
Still, it is important to remember that the government escaped from
the Supreme Court-which vacated the affirmance of his conviction-
with the possibility of retrying McDonnell on the same charges and facts.
The Court left to the Fourth Circuit the task of deciding the question of
retrial, stating, "[i]f the Court below determines that there is sufficient
evidence for a jury to convict Governor McDonnell of committing or
agreeing to commit an 'official act,' his case may be set for a new trial. 147
The evidentiary issues are not easy. In particular, any retrial would have
presented the question of whether the actions for which McDonnell could
not be prosecuted could nonetheless be introduced as evidence of an
agreement on actions he did not take.
The Court left open an argument for dismissal on the ground of
insufficient evidence. 148 The Court has previously held that: "The
successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any ground other than
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, poses no double
jeopardy ban to further prosecution on the same charge." 149 Thus,
"' Trip Gabriel, Judge Rejects Defense's Criteria for Convicting Ex-Governor as
Jury Gets Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2014, at A16. It seems unusual, to say the least, for
the Times to cover jury instructions.
146 From the beginning of his argument for the Government, Michael Dreeben
became enmeshed in the complexities of defining "official act" and attempting to cope
with a bewildering range of hypotheticals. Transcript, supra note 60, at 30-31.
147 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.
141 Id. ("If the court below determines that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to
convict Governor McDonnell of committing or agreeing to commit an 'official act,' his
case may be set for new trial.").
149 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1978). Retrials can present double-
jeopardy issues, but in general, the courts have endorsed the views of Justice Holmes. See
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[L]ogically
and rationally a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause,
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assuming that the prosecution could not introduce new evidence at any
retrial, 150 there must have been sufficient evidence of the presence of
official acts somewhere in the case as tried.
The Supreme Court built upon the Fourth Circuit's opinion. That
court had identified three potential "questions or matters" at issue in the
case: (1) whether state researchers would study the donor's product; (2)
whether the state would allocate grant money for a study of its ingredient;
and, (3) whether the product would be covered in the state employee
health plan. 151 The Supreme Court agreed, stating that "those qualify as
questions or matters under § 201(a)(3). Each is focused and concrete, and
each involves a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in
nature to a lawsuit, administrative determination, or hearing."
152
Thus one element might be satisfied, but where is the crime if
McDonnell did not take any actions on those matters, such as exerting
influence? It is key to remember the role of 18 U.S.C. § 201 in
prosecutions such as McDonnell's. The underlying offense is mail or wire
fraud. 153 The Court in Skilling held that those crimes could include
deprivation of honest services, but narrowed that concept to include only
bribery and kickbacks. Skilling also stated that honest services bribery
would "draw[] content" from federal statutes such as § 201 .154 What has
happened is that § 201-applicable to federal officials-has effectively
become the offense of conviction, although not of indictment, for state
officials accused of honest services fraud or violation of the Hobbs Act
(which is treated as the equivalent of bribery). 
155
however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its
beginning to the end of the cause.").
151 See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
151 McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 515-16.
152 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370.
153 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012).
151 Skillingv. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 366 (2010).
155 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
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Section 201 makes it a crime, in part, when a (federal) public
official "corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive
or accept anything of value ... in return for: (A) being influenced in the
performance of any official act . . ,156 Performance of the act is not
necessary. Agreement is enough. Many cases state that "the offense is
completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return
for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid
pro quo is not an element of the offense [of bribery]. 157 Moreover, the
agreement need not be explicit. 158 The Court in McDonnell repeated these
points of black letter law. It added that the official need not intend to
perform the act, as long as the jury concludes that the official "received a
thing of value knowing that it was given with the expectation that the
official would perform an 'official act' in return."
159
In other words, despite all the attention that commentators have
paid to whether McDonnell performed any official act, he need not have
done so at all. 160 It is enough that he "agreed" to do so-the opinion is
156 18 U.S.C § 201(b)(2) (2012).
157 Evans, 504 U.S. at 260, 268.
151 Id. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The official and the payor need not state the
quidpro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by
knowing winks and nods. The inducement from the official is criminal if it is express or
if it is implied from his words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor
so interprets it.").
159 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371 (2016).
160 Justice Sotomayor made the point forcefully during the oral argument:
I thought that this crime was taking money knowing that it was being paid to
influence an "official act." So aren't all of these examples of "official acts"
whether or they are or they aren't irrelevant? The question is, what was his
intent at the moment he took the money? And why couldn't.., a jury infer at
that moment that he took it with the intent to commit an "official act" the way
Mr. Williams wanted it committed?
Transcript, supra note 60, at 9. Many commentators have assumed that the case turned on
whether McDonnell did perform official acts on his benefactor's behalf. A good example
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replete with references to "agree," "agreement," etc. 161 -even if he didn't
mean to follow through. A possible conclusion is that the same actions
that were not "official" enough to create liability could apparently be re-
introduced as "evidence of an agreement," 162 that the jury could consider.
The Court stated that "[t]he jury may consider a broad range of pertinent
evidence, including the nature of the transaction, to answer that
question." 163 Thus, while the Court is clear that setting up a meeting is not
normally an official act, it could apparently be considered by the jury as
evidence of an agreement. What is not clear is the probative status of acts
taken that did not rise to the level of "pressure" or "advice." 164 They
should certainly be relevant to the question of an agreement. Indeed, if the
conduct looked like an attempt to pressure another official, it might
constitute a sufficient exercise of governmental power to constitute an
official act. The government decided not to retry McDonnell. 165 The scope
of a second McDonnell trial, had there been one, is unclear. However, the
second trial could have ended up looking a lot like the first. 166
is Boston Globe political columnist Joan Vennochi, who wrote that "McDonnell received
gifts but couldn't deliver results; hence, no crime, the Supreme Court ruled." Joan
Vennochi, Ortiz Critics are Riding to Marty Walsh 's Defense, BOSTON GLOBE (July 6,
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opiion/2016/07/06/ortiz-critics-are-riding-marty-
walsh-defense/j 8UJ4MdxvxCAlbrL7BNmoN/story.html.
161 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370-71.
162 See id. at2371.
163 id.
164 This is true of many of the acts that McDonnell performed.
165 See Rosalind S. Helderman et al., Prosecutors Will Drop Cases Against Former
Va. Governor Robert McDonnell, Wife, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.wasingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/prosecutors-will-drop-case-against-
former-va-gov-robert-mcdonnell/2016/09/08/a 19dc50a-6878-1 le6-ba32-
5a4bf5aad4fa story .html.
166 The theory of the second trial, as developed here, would have varied substantially
from the language of the original indictment. As noted, double jeopardy considerations
might be present. But see United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009)
(" [T]he government is free to pursue any theory of the crime available to it under the
indictment so long as that theory is not barred for some other reason (such as collateral
estoppel).").
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Overall, it looks like proponents of the critique got something less
than a complete victory. The case may be a step in their direction, but it is
at best a tentative one that does not break new ground. For example,
importance must be attached to the fact that the Court did not cite Citizens
United as support for its holding. McDonnell and many of his amici cited
it as an important component of their argument. 167 A maj or element of the
criminalization critique is that the rationale of that case extends to all
corruption issues, not just those in the electoral context. 168 However,
Citizens United-like language did find its way into the opinion when the
Court said "[t]he basic compact underlying representative government
assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act
appropriately on their concerns." 169 The Court's decision leads to some
uncertainty, both in terms of McDonnell's own case, and in terms of
broader concerns about the federal anti-corruption enterprise.
III. ANTICORRUPTION LAW POST-MCDONNELL
The Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Skilling was regarded as a
"bombshell., 170 The Court curtailed sharply the reach of the honest
167 E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 25, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355
(2016); Brief for Members of the Virginia General Assembly as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 7-9, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No.
15-474); Brief for Former Attorneys General, supra note 9, at 2; Brief of Amicus Curiae
James Madison Center for Free Speech Supporting Petitioner at 13-16, McDonnell v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief of Amicus Curiae Republican
Governors Public Policy Committee in Support of Petitioner at 2, 6, McDonnell v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Center for Law and Justice in Support of Petitioner at 9, 12, 13, 18, 21, McDonnell v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); see also, Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 14, 15, 25, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-
474).
161 See Applying Citizens United, supra note 16, at 229.
169 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
170 ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 341.
2017]
Virginia Journal of Criminal Law
services concept, restricting it to bribery and kickbacks. 171 The reach of
federal anticorruption prosecutions was curtailed, although prosecutors
have explored the outer boundaries of Skilling. The question arises
whether McDonnell is a case of similar magnitude-a further sharp
restriction-or simply a necessary corrective to an unduly broad
construction of a particular statutory term in a particular context. The
decision lends itself to both broad and narrow interpretations. The next
two subsections explore questions now on the table, both in the context of
bribery and in the broader anticorruption context.
A. MCDONNELL AND BRIBERY
Post McDonnell bribery cases are likely to raise several important
substantive issues. In particular, McDonnell's major result will be to shift
the focus of any prosecution away from the act preformed to the earlier
stages of the interactions between the donor and the donee. The
Government is on notice that courts will scrutinize prosecutions for acts
performed as part of a quid pro quo. After McDonnell, the questions of
whether such acts rise to the level of "official" and whether the
defendant's conduct can be viewed as taking action may be difficult.
1. EVIDENCE OF AN AGREEMENT
At the same time, under the analysis offered earlier, the
Government retains the option of reaching further up the chain of conduct
and focusing on whether there was an agreement. The Government gains
the advantage of being able to emphasize the quid, the transfer of value for
which the defendant is most vulnerable in the eyes of the jury.
172
However, the issue of implicit agreement is liable to receive more intense
scrutiny. The acts taken by McDonnell might show an implicit agreement
171 Skillingv. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 407-08 (2010).
172 This is particularly true in a case like McDonnell where the large amount is liable
to affect the jury
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to help the benefactor. On the other hand, to the extent the acts performed
are ordinary political actions-which appears to have been important to
the Court in McDonnell-the question would arise whether using them as
evidence would be tantamount to criminalizing them.
2. THE OFFICIAL' S STATE OF MIND
Focus on the agreement would bring to the fore the issue of the
official's state of mind. The McDonnell Court repeated standard bribery
language to the effect that no action need be taken, and that, indeed, the
official need not intend to take any.173 The receipt of the thing of value
completes the crime as long as the official knows what is expected of him
or her. 174 As Professor Alschuler states, "[flinding an appropriate standard
[to describe the bribe-taker's mental state] has not been easy." 175 He
quotes language from the Second Circuit to the effect that "[a] recipient's
knowledge of a donor's intent to influence is insufficient to support
conviction. The recipient must take the proffered thing of value 'intending
to be influenced.' ,176 He quotes Sun-Diamond's statement that "for
bribery there must be a quidpro quo-a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act." 177 The issue of the
recipient's intent could well arise in a McDonnell-like case. He seems to
have gone to great lengths to prove that he never intended to exercise
official power to help the benefactor. 178 Thus future cases might shed light
173 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371. See Robertson, supra note 65, at 34 ("Jurors seem
to follow the law that the exchange agreement is the criminal act, regardless of whether
the bargain is performed. Jurors do not seem to need evidence of performance of the
agreement as evidence to prove the agreement occurred.").
174 id.
175 Alschuler, supra note 7, at 470.
176 Id. (quoting United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2006)).
177 Id. at 474 (quoting United States v. Sun Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05
(1999)).
17" Robert McCartney, Fuzzy Federal Law Just Might Let McDonnells off the Hook,
WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2015, at B1. McCartney states that McDonnell may have been
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on the important issue of the recipient's state of mind, in particular
whether intent to be influenced is required, or whether knowing
acceptance is sufficient.
3. THE SPECIFICITY OF THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN
As one commentator states, "the precise transactional dynamic
sufficient to constitute honest services fraud has been widely interpreted to
be an open question."1 79 Many lower courts have accepted the "stream of
benefits" theory.1 80 This theory encompasses transfers made now in order
to bring about action to be taken later. Many courts do not require specific
actions to be identified at the time of the initial transfer.181 Decisions refer
to concepts like payments for actions to be taken "as opportunities
arose,"' I82 or on "as needed" basis.i13 It is possible to question whether this
lack of specificity dilutes the crime of bribery to what Professor Alschuler
calls a "one hand washes the other" approach. I84 In construing the
gratuities component of 18 U.S.C. § 201, the Supreme Court refused to
read it as reaching payments made to build up a "reservoir of goodwill.1 85
"shrewd enough to stay barely on the right side of the law by avoiding doing too much to
help the businessman who gave him the Rolex watch, Ferrari ride and other goodies." Id.
179 Connor, supra note 51, at 336.
1"o See generally Applying Citizens United, supra note 16, at 215-23.
181 Id. at 220-21.
182 See id. at 218, n.359.
183 Id. at 218, n.360.
114 Alschuler, supra note 7, at 481.
115 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 405 (1999).
Professor Teachout is critical of Sun-Diamond, stating that " [i]f you read the case as
political theory, instead of statutory interpretation, the Court suggests that using money to
influence power through gifts is both inevitable and not troubling. In so doing, it set the
table for the Court's major corruption decision in Citizens United." ZEPHYR TEACHOUT,
CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED
229 (2014).
McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics
The Court read specificity into the statutory term "any." 186 It could take
the same approach to 18 U.S.C. § 201's definition of bribery as including
intent "to influence any official act." 187 It is true that the Court in
McDonnell identified specific official acts that would presumably be the
focal point of a retrial.1 88 On the other hand, the original indictment
paraphrased classic stream of benefits language. Again, McDonnell might
lead to a narrowing of the law of honest services bribery.
B. MCDONNELL AND THE CRITIQUE
After an in-depth consideration of McDonnell, it is possible to
consider its relationship to the criminalization of politics critique explored
at the beginning of the article. Proponents of the critique were among
McDonnell's amici.18 9 Indeed, the briefs are replete with references to
aspects of it. 190 The unanimous decision was seen as a major victory by
supporters of McDonnell and of the critique.1 91 The New York Times
reported that defense attorneys in other corruption prosecutions saw the
decision as giving possible new hope to their clients' cases.1 92 Indeed,
116 Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. at 406.
117 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
1 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2016).
1" This is certainly the case with respect to The National Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys.
190 Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Supporting Petitioner and Urging Reversal at 10, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief of Center for Law and Justice, supra note 9, at 3-5
( [McDonnell] merely facilitated consideration of a donor's issue by the relevant
government officials."). Id. at 5.
191 See supra note 113.
192 Eric Lipton & Benjamin Weiser, Supreme Court Complicates Corruption Cases
from New York to Illinois, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 2016, at A14. See generally Shelley
Murphy, Supreme Court's Corruption Decision Could Affect Mass. Cases, BOSTON
GLOBE (July 21, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/07/2 1/supreme-court-
decision-could-affect-corruption-cases-
massachusetts/OE5DkfwdfLnKS2VoeuZaaI/story.html.
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McDonnell was invoked as relevant to a labor extortion case allegedly
involving a mayor's office. 193
Is McDonnell another Skilling, particularly if read as an
endorsement of the critique? Perhaps, but I am reluctant to read it this
broadly. The Court did not reverse the conviction, but vacated it, invoking
the possibility of a retrial for what McDonnell did. The government's big
mistake was not the fact of prosecuting him, but its central theory that
virtually all routine political acts are "official acts." I see the Court's
treatment of this problem of statutory construction as limiting official acts
to a subset that involves enough governmental power so that officials
performing or agreeing to perform them can be prosecuted for corruption.
The point is not that everybody does it (perform official acts) all the time,
but that they cannot receive outside payment for doing it or agreeing to.
It is also far from clear that McDonnell is an endorsement of the
Citizens United approach to corruption issues outside the electoral context.
By the Citizens United approach, I mean a view of electoral politics and
government in general as a floating bazaar of responsiveness, reciprocity,
transactions, and interactions that never stops. This view does not
adequately consider the difference between the pre- and post-electoral
context. Once the election is over, executives take on (at least partially)
the mantle of administrators, guided by the ideal of equal administration of
the laws. Non-elected officials are subject to such duties all the time. Even
legislators are expected to represent all their constituents.
McDonnell, and his amici's heavy reliance on Citizens United, at
times seemed to equate the benefactor's largesse with campaign
contributions, and indeed, to treat the benefactor as just another donor. 194
The Court's opinion is not based on any such analogy, but on a common
sense construction of a statutory term.
193 Milton J. Valencia, Analysts Split on What May Come Next, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
7,2016, at Al, All.
194 Brief of Former Federal Officials, supra note 78, at 12; Brief of Center for Law
and Justice, supra note 9, at 3-5.
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CONCLUSION
McDonnell leads to uncertainty about the future of federal anti-
corruption law. Its importance is undeniable, even though it fails to match
the magnitude of Skilling. Like Skilling, McDonnell involves the honest
services concept. It may well represent a further reduction in the utility of
that concept to prosecutors. McDonnell's impact, however, is substantially
lessened by the prosecution's position in the case that virtually anything a
government official does is an official action. The Supreme Court's
decision understandably rejects this reading of the relevant statute.
Ultimately the case's main impact may not be so much in the context of
any particular statute. Rather-echoing the critique of the criminalization
of politics-it sends a message to federal prosecutors not to push the
envelope, by stretching statutory terms beyond their commonsense
meaning. The critique thus emerges, not as a paradigm shift in
anticorruption law, but essentially as a canon of statutory construction. It
is ironic that this result came in a case where there was a straightforward
approach and the conduct was so egregious. Perhaps there is such a thing
as a free Rolex, but only when the government mishandles the case against
taking it.
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